ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a new structure-recovery cryptanalysis against 16-round Skipjack-like structure in which all the inner transformations are unknown. Our attack is divided into three phases. In the first phase, we use yoyo game to recover the outermost round functions. In the second phase, we use integral attack to achieve the round functions in round 2/3/4/13/14/15. A series of equations based on integral distinguishers is established to recover these inner transformations. However, effective integral distinguishers cannot be constructed for shorter rounds. For this reason, we propose a guess and determine attack to recover the residue round functions in the third phase. For n-bit Skipjack-like cipher, our attack can be executed within time complexity O(2 2.81×n/4 ) and data complexity O(2 n/2 ), and thus can lead to a practical attack against 16-round Skipjack cipher.
I. INTRODUCTION
Iterative structures are widely used in the design of block ciphers. In recent years, some cryptanalysis techniques which focus on iterative structure itself have sparked cryptanalysts' great interests (e.g. structural cryptanalysis [1] , [2] , impossible differential cryptanalysis [3] , integral cryptanalysis [4] , etc.). Among these attacks, we are specially interested in structural attack. In the structural attack, analysers need not focus on the details, which means they cannot exploit the specific weaknesses of concrete cryptographic functions. As a result, for a given block cipher, structural attack often seems weaker than traditional attacks. From another point of view, structural attacks will be efficient when the internal functions are unknown or key-dependent, which means structural attacks can be used in analysing a class of block ciphers.
Up to now, the research results on structural attack mainly include SPN structures and Feistel structures. Biryukov and Shamir [2] explored methods to recover the inner layers of a special SPN structure named SASAS, i.e., three S-boxes ''S'' and two affine transformations ''A''. In their work, attackers don't know anything about the details of S-boxes or linear layers and the only information available is the full (or part) code-book of SASAS. In ASIACRYPT 2014, the decomposition of ASASA was first considered by Biryukov et al. [5] and on the basis of the above research achievement, Dinur et al. [6] pursued several ways to decompose ASASA, which improved previous results significantly. In addition, several specific cases of these general schemes also draw researchers' attention, e.g., the security of AES with a secret S-box [7] . Besides the SPN structures, a series of papers focus on the decomposition of the Feistel structures. In CRYPTO 2015, Biryukov and Perrin [8] established CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form) to recover the inner round functions for 5-round Feistel Networks. Recently, an interesting recovery strategy called yoyo game, which was first proposed by Biham et al. [9] for cryptanalysis of 16 round of Skipjack, was used to decompose 5-round Feistel Networks [10] . Table 1 summarizes some major structural attack results against SPN structures and Feistel structures.
Besides the SPN structures and the Feistel structures, another important structure of a block cipher is the generalized Feistel structure, which was first introduced by Schneier and Kelsey [12] . It has many variants, such as Skipjacktype Feistel structure [13] , CLEFIA-type Feistel structure [14] , CAST256-type Feistel structure [15] and so on. Generalized Feistel structure keeps most of the advantages of traditional Feistel structure such as it has decryption-encryption similarity and the inverse of round function is not necessary in decryption, which makes the design of round function more simple and flexible. The security analysis of generalized Feistel structures is of great importance when they are used to design new block ciphers.
In this paper, we will focus on the decomposition of 16-round Skipjack, which was designed by NSA and its algorithm description was kept secret originally. In 1998, Skipjack was declassified and its structure was made public for the first time. Skipjack is a 64-bit block cipher and the key size is 80-bit. It uses two generalized Feistel structures Rule A and Rule B (see Fig. 1 ) as its architectures and the round functions must be invertible. Skipjack applies 8-round of Rule A first, followed by 8-round of Rule B, whereafter, 8-round of Rule A and finally 8-round of Rule B. Our decomposition target is 16-round Skipjack (8-round Rule A followed by 8-round Rule B). We use n to denote the block size of Skipjack and m to denote the width of each dateline (n = 4m). The round function of each round is denoted by F i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 16) and the 16-round Skipjack is shown in Fig. 2 . Note that we omit the round constant addition which does not affect our attack. This paper mainly concentrates on the structure-recovery cryptanalysis of 16-round Skipjack and the main results of this paper are listed as follows:
(1) We revisit the yoyo game proposed by Biham et al. [9] and based on their work, we present several interesting properties and use the yoyo game technique to recover the outermost round functions F 1 and F 16 . (2) For the rest, we first peel the outermost round functions which have been recovered in the previous phase and propose some integral distinguishers to establish a large amount of linear equations to achieve our aim. (3) In our attack, we find that, for shorter rounds, no useful integral distinguishers can be constructed for further decomposition. Therefore, we propose a guess and determine attack to recover the residued round functions. (4) Our results is the first structure-recovery cryptanalytic result of 16-round Skipjack as far as we know and our attack requires O(2 2.81×n/4 ) time complexity and O(2 n/2 ) data complexity, thus can lead a practical attack against 16-round Skipjack cipher. The rest of this paper is organized as below: Section II prepares some basic preliminaries. Section III describes a structural attack on the outermost round functions of 16-round Skipjack. Section IV focuses on the structuredecomposition problems for round 2/3/4/5/13/14/15. Section V proposes a guess and determine attack for the rest round functions. Finally, Section VI concludes our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. THE YOYO GAME OF 16-ROUND SKIPJACK Yoyo game was first presented by Biham et al. [9] as a new cryptographic tool. It can be used to find the secret key of 16-round Skipjack efficiently. Further study on yoyo game was explored by Biryukov et al. [10] to attack the 5-round Feistel networks with secret round functions. Besides, the yoyo game was used in the analysis of AES [16] recently. In this paper, we propose a way to recover the outermost round functions of 16-round Skipjack (i.e. F 1 and F 16 ) on the basis of Biham et al.'s work [9] . Firstly, we briefly introduce the yoyo game of 16-round Skipjack. VOLUME 6, 2018 Let P = (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ) and P = (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ) be a pair of plaintexts of 16-round Skipjack whose encryptions difference is (0, , 0, 0) at the input of round 5. Biham et al. [9] mentioned that only affects the first branch in round 12, which means for the other three branches the differences between rounds 5 and 12 are 0. Then exchange the value of the second branch, and the plaintexts pair ((m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ), (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 )) still satisfies this property. Similarly, after exchanging the ciphertexts of the first branch, they satisfy this property as well.
In this way, the yoyo game of 16-round Skipjack can operate as follows: choose an arbitrary pair of plaintexts P 0 and P 0 , then encrypt P 0 and P 0 , denote the ciphertexts by C 0 and C 0 , exchange the first branch of C 0 and C 0 , receive C 1 and C 1 , then decrypt C 1 and C 1 , denote the plaintexts by P 1 and P 1 , and exchange the second branch of P 1 and P 1 . Repeat the above operations continually and we can get a series of plaintexts/ciphertexts pairs generated by the yoyo game. Fig. 3 briefly shows the process. Definition 1: Let (P, P )/(C, C ) be a pair of plaintexts/ciphertexts of 16-round Skipjack. If either of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(1) there is a difference (0, , 0, 0) at the input of round 5; (2) there is a difference (δ, 0, 0, 0) at the output of round 12; we call (P, P )/(C, C ) satisfies property O. Moreover, since there is a truncated difference with probability 1 in Fig. 4 , we can prove that these two conditions in Definition 1 can be mutually transformed. The difference (0, , 0, 0) at the input of round 5 always leads to the difference (δ, 0, 0, 0) at the output of round 12 and vice-versa. It's worth noting that if the yoyo game starts with a pair which satisfies property O, all the consequent pairs generated by the yoyo game satisfy this property as well. Whereas the yoyo game starts with a pair which doesn't satisfy property O, by checking whether the difference of the 3rd branch of plaintexts or the 4th branch of ciphertexts is 0, we can discard it just after few steps. The probability of an error pair satisfying the difference 0 is 2 −m . Thus, for a given error pair, after a few steps of yoyo game, the probability of all the generated pairs passing the detection is nearly 0, which means if the generated pairs still pass the differential detection after a few steps, we have enough confidence to claim these pairs satisfy property O.
B. THE BASIC CONCEPTIONS OF INTEGRAL ATTACK
Integral attack is a powerful cryptanalysis originated from Square attack proposed by Daemen et al. [17] . It distinguishes cipher algorithm from random by calculating the values of ciphertexts encrypted from a set of plaintexts with a specified property. In this part, we give the notion of a multiset and several definitions of integral properties.
Definition 2 [2] : A multiset is a collection of texts which can be represented as a list of (value, multiplicity) pairs and the size of the multiset is the sum of all its multiplicities. (e.g. the multiset {1,1,2,2,3,3,3,3} can be represented as {(1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 4)} and the size is 8.)
Definition 3 [2] : We define the following symbols for integral properties:
A (Active): Each one of the possible values appears once in the multiset.
B (Balance): The XOR of all texts in the multiset is 0. C (Constant): All values in the multiset are equal to a constant.
E (Even): Each value occurs even times in the multiset. ? (Unknown): No useful information can be obtained in the multiset.
Based on the above definitions, for common operations, there are several interesting properties.
Property 1 [17] . The operations on the multiset which have different integral properties satisfy the following properties:
(1) The property A of a multiset still remains its property through bijective functions. (2) The property B of a multiset is uncertain through nonlinear-bijective functions. (3) The sum of two multisets which both possess property B has property B. (4) The sum of two multisets which possess property A and property C respectively has property A. (5) The sum of two multisets which both possess property C still has property C. Note that if a multiset has property A, C or E, it must have property B, but in our attack, we only concern about the multisets that satisfy property B but not property A, C or E.
III. RECOVER THE OUTERMOST ROUND FUNCTIONS F 1 AND F 16
In this section, we will present a method to recover the outermost round functions F 1 and F 16 . We take full advantage of the yoyo game of 16-round Skipjack proposed in [9] . Before we propose the structural attack, we exploit two important properties of 16-round Skipjack.
Property 2: Let (P 0 , P 0 ) = ((m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ), (m 1 , m 2 ,  m 3 , m 4 ) ) be a pair of plaintexts with property O, then
Proof: Since (P 0 , P 0 ) satisfies property O, which means that the input difference of round 5 is (0, , 0, 0). Then by analyzing the structure between round 1 and round 4 (see Fig. 5 ), we can construct a linear equation , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) ) be a pair of ciphertexts with property O, then F Based on Property 2 and Property 3, it is easy to utilize yoyo game to recover the round functions F 1 and F 16 . We use the example of F 1 to illustrate our attack. Prior to the structural attack on 16-round Skipjack, a preprocessing phase is executed to collect several correct yoyo game pairs, which is described in Algorithm 1. Assume that if the yoyo game starts with a wrong pair which does not satisfy property O, then we can discard it just after few steps of yoyo game by checking whether the plaintexts difference of the 3rd branch is 0. According to Fig. 5 , when we choose a plaintext pair with the difference of the 3rd branch is 0, the probability of this pair satisfying property O is 2 −2m .
Since we gain a correct yoyo game pair, we can generate a sequence of correct pairs. Then the structural attack procedure to recover F 1 can be described as follows: for each correct yoyo game pair However, it is worth noting that we cannot get a system of equations with a full rank, because of the existence of equivalent structures. For 16-round Skipjack, we present its equivalence structures in Theorem 1. The output of the 16-round Skipjack described in Theorem 1 does not depend on the value of c i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 12). In other words, our attack gives equivalence representations of all the inner round functions. Though it might be different from the original definitions, the equivalent structure is able to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary texts as 16-round Skipjack. We make a series of experiments for m = 4 and we always get a linear system of rank 15 in 16 variables, which indicates that Theorem 1 contains all the equivalent structures of 16-round Skipjack. Thus we can fix one entry of F 1 arbitrarily and then receive a unique solution.
Complexity Analysis: Since the probability of receiving a correct yoyo game pair is 2 −2m by Algorithm 1, the data complexity of the preprocessing phase is about 2 2m . In the structural recovery phase, in order to get 2 m equations, we should use 2 m chosen plaintexts generated by correct yoyo pairs. In total, the data complexity is about O(2 2m ). The time complexity is dominated by solving each system of linear equations with Gaussian elimination, whose time complexity is 2 2.81m steps with Strassens Algorithm, so the time complexity of the this attack is about O(2 2.81m ).
IV. RECOVER ROUND 2/3/4/13/14/15 WITH INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHERS
Since we have already recovered the outermost round functions F 1 and F 16 , a natural question then is, how to recover the rest F i s. We divide our attack into two phases and use different methods to solve this problem. Before our attack, we assume that the outermost round functions already have been peeled off, which means we only need to attack 14 rounds, from round 2 to 15.
In this section, we seek out several integral distinguishers to construct a series of linear equations. When sufficient equations are obtained, we use the Gaussian elimination to solve these equations to recover the unknown round functions F 2 , F 3 , F 4 , F 13 , F 14 , F 15 . Our idea originated from the structural attack of SASAS which considered the integral properties of chosen plaintexts. A lot of research targeting on the decomposition problem adopt this idea as their fundamental method, such as the decomposition of ASASA [6] (Sec.3), the cryptanalysis of Feistel Networks with secret round functions [10] (Sec.6), the security of AES with a secret S-Box [7] (Sec.3).
We first introduce the integral distinguishers used in our paper, then we present the specific recover algorithm.
Theorem 2 (13-Round Integral Distinguisher): Let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ {0, 1} m , choose P = { (c 1 , x, c 2 , c 3 ) , x ∈ {0, 1} m } be the inputs of round 2. Let 14 , 15 be the corresponding inputs of F 14 and F 15 of the elements in P, respectively, then 14 15 = 0.
The 13-round distinguisher is shown in Table 2 .
Using the 13-round integral distinguisher, we will provide a method to recover F 14 and F 15 . Take F 15 as an example: let x k be the m-bit input to F 15 which produces k as an output (i.e.
When we choose a collection P of plaintexts described in Theorem 2, using the first subblock ciphertexts whose exclusive-or sum is 0, we can construct an equation for the unknown variables Similar to the yoyo game phase, rank deficiency and equivalence structure problem also exist there, which implies that we cannot get a unique solution. Fortunately, this problem does not affect our attack, so as in Theorem 1, we can also get corresponding equivalence structures. Besides we make a series of implementations of the attack for m = 4 and always get a linear system of rank 15, which is one less compared to the full rank. The experiment results indicate that we can only get a general rather than a unique solution. In other words, for any one of the nontrivial solutions, we do not get the original definition F 15 , but an equivalent representation solution. Similarly, F 14 can be recovered by the same way. In addition, we give an 11-round integral distinguisher from the decrypt direction (round 13 to 3) to recover F 2 and F 3 .
Theorem 3 : Let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ {0, 1} m and C = { (c 1 , x, c 2 , c 3 ) , x ∈ {0, 1} m } be the inputs of round 13. Let 2 and 3 be the corresponding inputs of F 2 and F 3 of the elements in C, respectively, then 2 and 3 satisfy:
The 11-round distinguisher is shown in Table 3 .
By Theorem 3, a linear equation system can be established to decompose F 2 and F 3 . Note that the same method can be used to recover the residued round functions. For simplicity, we just make a list of the integral distinguishers used in our attack (see Table 4 ). Complexity Analysis: In order to get 2 m equations for each F i respectively, we need to use 2 m chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts. Concretely, we need 6×2 m chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts in this phase. The time complexity is mainly spent on solving linear equations system in Algorithm 2. We need to call Gaussian elimination algorithm six times in total, thus the time complexity of this phase attack is about O(2 2.81m ).
V. RECOVER THE MIDDLE 8 ROUNDS WITH GUESS AND DETERMINE ATTACK
Since the first 4 rounds and the last 4 rounds have been recovered, only the middle 8 rounds (round 5 to 12) are left, but we find that no useful integral distinguishers can be constructed for further decomposition. In order to recover the rest round functions, we will give an equivalence structure first (see Fig. 8 ), and then we explore a guess and determine attack to achieve our aim.
As in the yoyo game phase, we can also freely choose one entry of F 5 , F 6 , F 7 and F 8 respectively, and this will not affect the recover results, then a guess and determine attack is described as follows to recover the round functions: 
(A ).
Note that in step 5, the probability of an error value passes the two equations is (2 m − 1) × 2 −m × 2 −m ≈ 2 −m . We can check whether F 5 table is a bijection or not to exclude the wrong situation, which indicates that the success probability of our attack is 1.
Complexity Analysis: For the guess and determine attack phase, we need to choose 5 × 2 m chosen plaintexts and in comparison to other steps, the time complexity is dominated by step 5 whose time complexity is about 2 2m .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a structural attack against 16-round Skipjack to recover the full details of each round functions. In our attack, we use yoyo game technique proposed in [9] to recover the outermost round functions. Furthermore, we present integral distinguishers to recover the rest round functions and we propose a guess and determine attack for shorter rounds. The total time complexity of our attack is O(2 2.81m ) and the data complexity is about O(2 2m ). We then implement a series of 16-bit Skipjack to verify our attack and the results of our experiments are consistent with the theoretical analysis. As far as we know, our results are the first structural attack against 16-round Skipjack.
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